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T
he last decade has witnessed a tre-
mendous increase in the mobility of
international capital. Cross-coun-
try trends in capital flows reveal that private
capital flows now dominate with official
capital flows reduced to a trickle. Simul-
taneously, a rise in portfolio capital has
tilted the composition of international
capital flows towards short-term invest-
ments, exposing individual countries to
enhanced volatility and sudden withdrawal
risks. These have been driven both by
strong trends towards globalisation, which
has enabled pursuit of higher returns and
portfolio diversification, and the market-
oriented reforms in many countries, which
have liberalised access to financial mar-
kets. Concurrent with these trends has been
the rising incidence of financial crises,
raising questions about linkages between
the two. Concern has also been expressed
as to whether the costs of increased vul-
nerability to financial fragility might not
outweigh the gains from financial deregu-
lation. Notwithstanding these doubts, most
countries continue to progress in disman-
tling capital controls to integrate their
financial markets with the rest of the world,
albeit more cautiously.
These developments have stimulated a
keen interest in understanding the nature
and economic effects of capital flows as
well as the appropriate policy responses
to safeguard against financial instability
that appears to be associated with inter-
national capital mobility. Capital flows
affect a wide range of economic variables
such as exchange rates, interest rates,
foreign exchange reserves, domestic mon-
etary conditions as well as savings and
investments. These issues are significant
for India as it gradually opens its capital
account as part of its broader financial
liberalisation strategy. Before 1991, India
had a closed capital account with capital
mobility being restricted through admin-
istrative controls and outright prohibition.
In the aftermath of the balance of payments
crisis in 1991, India embarked upon an
economic reform programme aimed at
transforming the controlled economy into
a market-driven one. Following changes
in exchange rate regime as well as trade
and investment policies’ reform, there was
a spurt in capital flows into the country
between 1992-93 to 1997-98. Though the
magnitude of these flows is relatively in-
significant in a cross-country perspective,
the pattern and composition of these flows
conforms to trends observed in other
emerging markets. India also shares some
attributes with these emerging economies,
a fact that enables a comparative assess-
ment. For example, like many Asian and
Latin American countries, which were at
various stages of macroeconomic
stabilisation and/or financial liberalisation,
when capital started flowing into these
economies towards the end of the 1980s,
India is a liberalising economy too. Notable
differences persist, for example, India ex-
hibits far lower openness than these coun-
tries and still retains strict capital controls,
specifically on outflows.
In the context outlined above, I attempt
three things. First, I document trends in
capital flows into India in a comparative
perspective. Two, I examine the impact of
these flows upon the key macroeconomic
variables in the economy. Three, I dwell
on implications for economic policy.
Section II of this paper traces trends in
capital inflows into India since the onset
of liberalisation, Section III assesses the
impact of these flows on the real exchange
rate, while Section IV discusses the policy
implications and concludes.
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Figure 1 plots the trends in net capital
inflows (sum of FDI, portfolio, loans and
resident Indian deposits) into India be-
tween 1985-98. The plot shows a recovery
of net capital inflows that had begun to
decline in the late 1980s and bottomed out
in the 1991 crisis. Following liberalisation
of restrictions on inward investment in
1991-92, there was a sharp increase in
capital inflows between 1992-95 and
1996-97.1 This is similar to the experi-
ences of other emerging economies in Asia
and Latin America, all of who typically
experienced a rise in inward foreign capi-
tal following market-oriented reforms. The
magnitude of capital flows into India is
much smaller though; the peak level for
India is 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1993-94,
which is small when compared to other
emerging markets. For instance, the peak
levels are above 20 per cent for Malaysia,
13 per cent for Thailand, 10 per cent for
the Philippines and almost 10 per cent for
Singapore between 1990-93 [Glick 1998:
4-5].2 Second, the swing in the capital
account observed in the case of other
emerging economies is not visible for
India so far Khan and Reinhart (1995)
estimate a change in the capital account
from – 2.4 per cent (GDP) on an average
between 1984-89 to 1.6 per cent (1990-93)
for ten Latin American countries and from
1.6 (1984-88) to 3.2 (1989-93) per cent
(GDP) for eight Asian ones. Comparative
Capital Account Liberalisation
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This paper documents trends in capital flows into India in a comparative perspective, examines
the impact of these flows on key macroeconomic variables and discusses
the implications for economic policy.





























































































































































































figures for India are 2.3 (1985-89) and 2.4
(1993-983) per cent of GDP, indicating
only a marginal increase. This is probably
explained by India’s relatively late start in
liberalising its trade and investment re-
gimes, by which time the competition for
international capital had already stiffened.
Though the magnitude of capital inflows
into India is at variance vis-a-vis Latin
America and other parts of Asia, there is
a common pattern in the composition.
World capital flows in the 1990s have
displayed a steep decline in official capital
flows and a rise in private investment,
particularly portfolio capital. This trend is
clearly reflected in Table 1 that profiles
the composition of India’s capital account
over the 1980s and 1990s. The substantial
contribution of aid towards the capital
account in the 1980s dwindles steadily
by the 1990s (excluding the IMF loan in
1991 and 1992). Official flows are re-
placed by private flows; a sharp increase
in foreign investment, direct and portfolio,
can be observed after 1992. Commercial
borrowings abroad drop during the crisis
years, resuming thereafter. Portfolio in-
vestment flows exceed direct investment
(FDI) in the early years of liberalisation.
The latter accelerates later, peaking in 1995
and falling thereafter. This feature con-
trasts with what is observed for the coun-
tries in the APEC region, where foreign
capital was dominated by FDI after the
opening of markets, with portfolio flows
increasing only in the early 1990s. In a
way, these movements reflect the global
trends: global financial markets had
changed substantially by the 1990s, with
portfolio capital flows registering a sharp
rise. More likely however, might be the
process of liberalisation in India. While
FDI procedures remained complicated and
discretionary, investment via the financial
markets route was much faster and sim-
pler. This might have tilted the composi-
tion of flows in favour of portfolio. A final
feature of the table is the continued de-
pendence upon migrants’ remittances, after
a short decline in 1993-94. It is important
to highlight one distinguishing feature of
the capital account in India during this
period. This is the distinction between
‘voluntary’ and ‘discretionary’ flows.
While FDI and portfolio investment are
voluntary by nature, external commercial
borrowings are discretionary, being moni-
tored closely. The variation in external
commercial borrowing suggests it might
be the offsetting item in the capital ac-
count. It appears to adjust according to the
movements in other components of the
capital account as can be observed in the
years 1992, 1998 and 1999.
The jump in foreign inward capital that
India experienced after reform/liberali-
sation, as well as the composition of these
inflows conforms to the evidence for
other developing countries.4 Two broad
explanations for this phenomenon have
been offered in the literature. One view-
point holds that the fall in US interest
rates5 between 1989-92, combined with
cyclical recession in the US, Japan and
many parts of Europe, drove world capital
to developing countries in search of higher
returns. The other view upholds the role
of ‘internal’ or ‘pull’ factors such as credible
economic reforms, improved macroeco-
nomic performance and domestic policies
that encouraged investor confidence and
attracted foreign investment.6,7 To what
extent are these explanations valid for
India?
One way of probing the ‘external fac-
tors’ hypothesis is to examine comparative
returns on domestic and foreign assets,
noting that capital mobility will be guided
by highest available returns. Due to lack
of data availability on comparable assets,
we compare interest rate differentials
between India and the rest of the world.
Figure 2 graphs the interest rate spread
between the prime lending rate in India and
Libor between 1993-2000.The interest
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Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India Table  1:  Composition  of  Capital  Flows  in  India
(Percentage  to  total  [net]  capital  flows)
Foreign  Investment NRI  Deposits External Commercial
Direct  Investment Portfolio Assistance Borrowings
1985 0 0 16.3 30.3 21.1
1989 0 0 34.4 26.5 25.4
1990 1.3 0.08 21.4 30.7 31.3
1991 3.4 0.10 10.6 77.7 40.0
1992 8.0 6.2 51.3 48.4 -9.2
1993 6.0 37.6 12.4 19.6 6.3
1994 14.6 39.1 1.9 16.7 11.3
1995 46.0 58.3 24.5 21.5 29.2
1996 24.7 28.9 29.4 9.9 24.7
1997 36.1 17.8 11.5 9.2 38.8
1998 28.5 -0.7 20.9 9.9 53.0
1999 21.2 29.5 20.3 8.6 3.0
Source: Author’s  calculations  based  on  figures  from  Report  on  Currency  and  Finance,  1998-99,  RBI,
Mumbai.
Figure  2:  Lending  Rate  Differentials  in  the  1990s Figure  2:  Lending  Rate  Differentials  in  the  1990s Figure  2:  Lending  Rate  Differentials  in  the  1990s Figure  2:  Lending  Rate  Differentials  in  the  1990s Figure  2:  Lending  Rate  Differentials  in  the  1990s
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spread narrows rapidly from 1993, mainly
because of a movement towards lower
interest rates after deregulation rather than
arbitrage. Foreign investors were allowed
to invest in debt instruments in 1997 (sub-
ject to a 30 per cent ceiling on total invest-
ment) and government treasury bills in
1998. The relatively high differential rate
of return on Indian assets possibly did
attract capital inflows.
The timing of these flows however,
suggests that internal or ‘pull’ factors were
equally, if not more, important. Before
1991, Indian financial markets were closed,
its trade and investment policies did not
exactly encourage foreign direct invest-
ment and its credit-rating along with in-
vestor confidence had ebbed following the
balance of payments crisis in 1991. Post-
crisis however, market-oriented reforms
were instituted by the government. The
macroeconomic performance of the
economy improved, as output growth
recovered on a higher trajectory, the rate
of inflation declined and debt/solvency
indicators improved. External debt restruc-
turing resulted in a decline of the short-
term to total debt ratio from 10.2 in 1991
to 3.9 in 1994; as a ratio to reserves, short-
term debt fell from 382.1 (1991) to 24.1
(1994) and further to 13.5 in 1998.8
Significant institutional, regulatory and
policy changes impacting the external
environment during this period were the
switch to a flexible exchange rate regime,9
consolidation of external debt, full con-
vertibility of current account transactions,
trade reforms,10 liberalisation of invest-
ment policies relating to FDI and financial
sector reforms. While the overall thrust of
the reforms served to improve interna-
tional investors’ confidence, there is no
doubt that specific measures to attract FDI
and portfolio capital into India catalysed
these inflows. These focused upon elimi-
nation of entry barriers and market inte-
gration. Foreign investment, which was
permitted only in cases of technology
transfer, was liberalised and the ceiling of
40 per cent on foreign equity participation
was relaxed, procedures were greatly sim-
plified. Elements of financial liberalisation
that have a direct bearing upon portfolio
investments were allowing foreign insti-
tutional investors to operate in the Indian
capital market; these investments, initially
restricted to equity, were subsequently
relaxed to include debt, including govern-
ment bonds.
Simultaneously, raising external re-
sources abroad by domestic corporates was
selectively liberalised.11 These develop-
ments are partly reflected in the growing
demand of institutional and private inves-
tors abroad, which has facilitated deposi-
tory issues in the US and Europe and equity
purchases by foreign institutional inves-
tors on the domestic stock exchanges
(Table 2). Equity  investment has been an
important channel for portfolio inflows in
other emerging markets too. Table 2 shows
that the volume of bond issues has in-
creased after 1991. These changes are
consistent with evidence available for other
emerging markets in Asia, where bond
issues nearly quadrupled between 1989
and 1992 [Khan and Reinhart 1995:18]
and continued to increase beyond
this period.
The composition of foreign capital is by
now well understood to make a difference
in impact. Thus short-term or portfolio
capital, which is subject to ‘sudden reversal’
and is, therefore, more volatile, renders the
recipient country extremely vulnerable.
Tentative evidence for India supports this
hypothesis as portfolio flows are more
volatile than FDI, as measured by the
standard deviation of the two series. The
standard deviation of portfolio investment
between 1990-99 is 5163.2 which is sub-
stantially larger than 4592.3 for FDI. The
difference in volatility increases when
measured at higher frequency, quarterly
(1900.5 and 1226.9 respectively) as well
as monthly (205.3 and 94 respectively).12
Portfolio flows also render the stock
markets more volatile through increased
linkages between the local and foreign
financial markets. Preliminary evidence
for India shows some support for this
hypothesis as the co-movement between
the share prices index and other stock
prices’ indicators during the capital surge
of 1992-95 shows in Figures 1, 3 and 4.
The rise in the share prices’ index presum-
ably contributed to the rise in market
capitalisation and the price-earnings ratios
during this period.13 Simple correlation
measures between portfolio capital flows
and the BSE share price index is positively
strong, 0.58. The price-earnings ratio is
observed to be doubling between 1990-91
and 1992-93 and dipping sharply after
1995, when the flows subsided. A similar
Table  2:  International  Bond  and  Equity Table  2:  International  Bond  and  Equity Table  2:  International  Bond  and  Equity Table  2:  International  Bond  and  Equity Table  2:  International  Bond  and  Equity
Issues  from  India Issues  from  India Issues  from  India Issues  from  India Issues  from  India
(Billions  of  US  $)
Year Global External Equity
Depository Commercial Investments
Receipts Borrowings by  Foreign
Institutional
Investors
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )
1990-91 – 2.24 –
1992-93 0.09 –0.42 –
1994-95 1.97 1.04 1.54
1996-97 0.93 2.85 2.12
1998-99 0.51 0.85 –0.19
Source: Report  on  Currency  and  Finance,  1998-99.
Data  for  FIIs  includes  both  debt  and  equity.
FIIs  were  allowed  to  invest  in  the  Indian
securities  market  only  in  September  1992,
in  debt  instruments  in  1997  (subject  to  an
overall  ceiling  of  30  per  cent  of  total
investment)  and  in  government  treasury
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trend is observed for the period of inflows’
boom in south-east Asia; this ratio doubled
between 1990-93 for Hong Kong and
Thailand. The negative consequences
were that it fuelled stock market booms
and contributed to market volatility in
the case of Mexico and the east Asian
economies.
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Several studies, notably Corbo and
Hernandez (1994), Calvo, Leidermann and
Reinhart (1994) and Khan and Reinhart
(1995), amongst others, have documented
the effects of capital inflows for a set of
Latin American and south-east Asian coun-
tries. Some commonly observed effects of
capital inflows are exchange rate appre-
ciation, monetary expansion, rise in bank
lending if the flows are intermediated
through banks and effects upon savings
and investment. This section considers the
effects of capital flows upon the real
exchange rate.
In theory, an inflow of foreign capital
will raise the level of domestic expenditure
in the economy, raising the demand for
non-tradable goods that results in an ap-
preciation of the real exchange rate. The
price-adjustment process then leads to a
reallocation of resources from tradable to
non-tradable goods and a switching of
expenditures in favour of non-tradables.
The rise in aggregate expenditure also
increases the demand for tradables, lead-
ing to a rise in imports and a widening of
the trade deficit. The transmission channel
of the real exchange rate appreciation will
however, depend on the exchange rate
regime. With a floating exchange rate and
no central bank intervention, the apprecia-
tion will take place through a nominal
appreciation, but in a fixed exchange rate
regime, the appreciation will work through
an expansion in the domestic money sup-
ply, aggregate demand and the prices of
non-tradables.
Figure 5 shows trends in the bilateral
(rupee-dollar), real and nominal, effective
exchange rates over three decades. The
nominal and real effective exchange rate
are both observed to be depreciating after
1985. After 1993, the time of regime switch,
the nominal depreciation persists. The real
exchange rate however displays a constant
trend, punctuated by two visible apprecia-
tion episodes. During the capital surge in
1992-95 and 1996-97, the real exchange
rate appreciated by 10.7 (August 1995)
and 14 (August 1997) per cent respectively
over its March 1993 level. The policy
response of the authorities was to avert a
nominal appreciation,14 preferring an ad-
justment through gradual increases in
domestic inflation.15 Part of the policy
response was directed  towards encourag-
ing capital outflows through early servic-
ing of external debt. India’s external adjust-
ment was also facilitated by the timing
of these inflows as they coincided with
trade reform, convertibility of the current
account and liberalisation of overseas
investments by Indian firms, measures
which were partly financed by the net
increase in capital assets during this period.
Both real exchange rate behaviour and
policy response in India bear a closer
similarity with east Asian economies than
the Latin American ones. The former mostly
limited adjustment of their currencies
vis-a-vis the US dollar, in contrast to the
Latin American countries, particularly
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, who allowed
much more exchange rate flexibility. Glick
(1998:8) has noted that though capital
inflows have been associated with real
exchange rate appreciation in both regions,
the extent of real exchange rate apprecia-
tion in the Asian region was far less than
the Latin American countries, presumably
due to differences in policy response. Khan
and Reinhart (1995) have pointed out that
differences in composition of aggregate
demand might account for this varied
exchange rate response across the two
regions. The investment/GDP ratio in-
creased by 3.5 per cent for the Asian group
of countries during the capital surge, but
stagnated in the Latin American region,
where private savings declined and con-
sumption rose.
A similar comparison for India shows
a 3.5 per cent increase in the investment/
GDP ratio between 1992-93 and 1994-95,
the capital inflow period. During this time,
private savings rose by an approximately
similar amount while consumption fell.
Thus the composition of aggregate de-
mand could also have curtailed a real
appreciation, though circumstances indi-
cate that policy response was undoubtedly
a major factor in thwarting appreciation
pressures upon the real exchange rate. For
example, when the flows abated by mid-
1995, the central bank effected an adjust-
ment in late 1995, bringing back the real
exchange rate closer to the March 1993
level.16 A similar policy response pre-
vailed when the real exchange rate appre-
ciated in response to capital inflows in
1996-97, the appreciation was reduced by
9 per cent in December 1997. These re-
sponses can be observed in real exchange
rate movements in Figure 5.
The behaviour of the real exchange rate
in response to capital inflows has been an
important area of concern and has been
examined in several recent studies. Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) and
Edwards (1999) have explored the asso-
ciation between capital inflows and real
exchange rates for a set of Latin American
countries. They find substantial evidence
that capital inflows contributed both to
real exchange rate appreciation and re-
serves’ accumulation in these countries.
Preliminary evidence for India shows
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and the net capital account to move
together in equilibrium, i e, the two series
are cointegrated. The bivariate relation-
ship (impulse response analysis) between
the two series indicates that a one standard
deviation shock to net capital account, i e,
a net inflow of foreign currency equivalent
of Rs 4,735.9 crore in the first quarter,
causes the real exchange rate to appreciate
by 0.14 per cent in the second quarter.17
Preliminary evidence for India there-
fore, corresponds to individual as well as
cross-country evidence on the subject. This
empirical evidence however, needs to be
examined further in depth, for though
fluctuations in real exchange rates can be
attributed to capital inflows, they can also
be affected by changes in the terms of
trade, government spending and monetary
as well as exchange rate policies. The
importance of the exercise need hardly be
emphasised as a significant implication of
this result is that a rise in inward capital
flows into the economy is likely to lead
to losses in international competitiveness
via real exchange rate appreciation. This
has implications for exchange rate policy,
which are spelt out in Section IV of the
paper.
I V I V I V I V I V
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The experience with liberalisation of
controls on inward capital flows in India
shows close similarities with other
liberalising economies of Latin America
and Asia. A striking difference between
India and these economies is that the
magnitude of capital inflows has not been
very large in India so as to cause intensive
macro- and micro-management problems.
As such, the challenges faced by India,
both in terms of impact upon important
economic variables as well as macroeco-
nomic management, have been far less.
Notwithstanding these differences how-
ever, many attributes of the Indian expe-
rience have been shown to bear strong
similarities with these economies in this
paper. Based on the analysis contained in
this paper, the key policy issues of concern
to India are of allowing the exchange rate
to change, sterilisation, the soundness and
capacity of the financial system to inter-
mediate large volumes of capital inflows
as well as the relative costs of particular
policies.
It is well known by now that the com-
position of flows makes a significant
difference, both in terms of impact and
smooth management. Portfolio flows are
more volatile than direct investment flows
and because of their short-term nature,
more difficult to intermediate smoothly.
They can cause uneven expansion and
contraction in domestic liquidity and thus
have a greater impact upon stock markets
and expansion in money supply and do-
mestic credit. Since sudden, large shifts in
portfolio demand for a country’s liabilities
can be very destabilising, portfolio flows
need to be skilfully intermediated. Direct
investment flows (FDI), on the other hand,
are long-term in nature and for that reason,
less volatile. Being visibly embedded in
investment in plant and equipment, FDI
is less susceptible to sudden withdrawals
out of the country and leads to productive
uses of capital and consequent economic
growth.
It is significant that the distribution of
capital flows between portfolio and FDI
flows into India tilts distinctly towards the
former in most years after liberalisation.
Foreign direct investment does not reveal
a stable trend so far. The relatively greater
contribution of portfolio capital towards
India’s capital account, and the fact that
these inflows could increase to significant
levels in the future as India’s financial
markets get integrated globally, show that
an important sphere of concern is their
skilful management to facilitate smooth
intermediation. There are two channels
through which inward capital can be in-
termediated  – the stock market or the
banking system. Preliminary evidence for
India on the relationship between portfolio
flows and some stock market indicators
suggests that market prices are not un-
affected by capital inflows. This exposes
the potential vulnerability of the economy
to sudden withdrawals of foreign investors
from the financial market, which will
affect liquidity and contribute to market
volatility. The state of development of
India’s financial markets, which are rela-
tively thin and underdeveloped, is likely
to be a severe constraint on intermediating
heavy volumes of volatile, short-term
capital, though it must be admitted in
fairness that the volume of transactions in
both foreign exchange and domestic money
markets has been steadily increasing in
the post-reform period. An increase in
the volume of capital inflows, therefore,
might necessitate excessive intermedia-
tion through the domestic banking sector.
What are the implications for India in this
regard?
Apart from imparting volatility in the
stock market, portfolio flows also have a
greater impact upon domestic monetary
expansion, if intermediated through the
banking system. Sudden, uneven increases
in intermediated funds will lead to an
irregular expansion in the volume of
domestic financial assets and liabilities.18
Unless sterilised, the volume of bank
lending is bound to rise and could lead to
unscrupulous lending, which if it finances
consumption or real estate, can trigger a
consumption boom. Moral hazard risks are
thus likely to increase, threatening finan-
cial instability, as transpired during the
Asian crisis.
In such a scenario, a sound banking
system is an essential prerequisite. The
state of the Indian banking system, parti-
cularly the public sector banks, is fragile.
Many of them are under-capitalised, with
large levels of non-performing loans
on their balance sheets. Though India’s
financial reforms have consistently
emphasised strengthening of prudential
regulation and supervisory standards,
sector as well as borrower-specific expo-
sure limits exist, and liquidity require-
ments are in place, the capacity of these
institutions to assess, price and manage
risks is doubtful. These capacities can be
created through structural changes and
institutional reform of these institutions,
which is still an unstarted agenda of finan-
cial reform in India.
The difference between net capital in-
flows and the current account deficit has
so far been negative in India, as a conse-
quence of which the impact upon the
banking system has been small. Thus
absorption by the central bank through
sterilisation and utilisation of bank re-
serves for financing import payments
(recall that capital inflows during this
period were used to liberalise trade trans-
actions) controlled commercial bank
lending during the past surge in capital
flows. The banking system in India how-
ever, accounts for 64 per cent of the total
financial assets of the economy, and a
sudden expansion in banks’ liabilities might
be very difficult to monitor, particularly
the end-use of loans. Real effects of inter-
mediated foreign capital depend pretty
much upon what these loans finance. For
example, in the ASEAN region and some
Latin American countries, like Chile and
Mexico, capital inflows have been asso-
ciated with high domestic savings, invest-
ment and economic growth. Absorption
was therefore smooth and did not disruptEconomic and Political Weekly April 14, 2001 1205
macroeconomic stability. However, in
the Latin American region, particularly
Argentina and Brazil, there was a rise in
private consumption. Instances when in-
ward foreign capital translated into a stock
market and real estate boom that ultimately
ended in a financial or currency crisis, as
in Malaysia and Thailand are also well
known.
So far, the evidence available for India
on this issue shows that capital flows
financed more investment than consump-
tion. Initially, the current account deficit
widened from 0.4 (1993) to 1.8 per cent
(1995) in correspondence with the capital
surge. This can be traced to a combination
of a 3.8 per cent increase in national
investment and a 3 per cent increase in
national savings during the same time.19
In a longer perspective however, i e,
between 1990 and 1995, the current ac-
count balance (as percentage of GDP)
improved by 1.5 per cent. This reduction
is accounted for by a rise in savings rate
by 1 per cent whereas the rate of invest-
ment actually fell by 0.6 per cent. This is
partly because public investment fell during
this period by almost  1.8 per cent though
private investment increased by almost 4
per cent. Disaggregation of private invest-
ment shows that it went into productive
sectors. Real private investment in con-
struction remained constant at 0.6 per cent
of GDP between 1991-1995, increasing
marginally by 0.1 per cent thereafter, while
equipment investment rose from 3.8 per
cent of GDP in 1990 to 6.4 per cent in 1993
and by another 2 per cent for 1994 and
1995.
A second issue is the response of the real
exchange rate to removal of capital ac-
count restrictions. This paper shows that
capital inflows are associated with real
appreciation in India. This is an area
where conflicting policy choices are bound
to arise. The policy option of stabilising
the real exchange rate to keep it constant
can be a source of potential conflict be-
tween external and internal objectives
and it may not always be possible to
reconcile  the two. Intervening foreign
currency purchases to stabilise the ex-
change rate and accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves has implications for
domestic monetary management, which
can be seriously impaired by divided short-
term monetary responses during a capital
surge. Monetary policy therefore has to be
untangled from exchange rate policy to be
able to respond effectively to domestic
objectives.
The option of a more flexible exchange
rate policy, which has the advantages of
insulating domestic money supply, domestic
credit and the banking system as well as
discouraging speculation through increased
exchange risk, carries with it the risk of
appreciation. A significant implication of
real appreciation is the loss in external
competitiveness, which hurts exports. This,
in turn, will lower the profitability of the
trading sectors of the economy and disrupt
the process of trade liberalisation. Second,
there are real adjustment costs associated
with exchange rate changes, which, if the
inflows are temporary, can severely disrupt
economic processes within the economy.
The major policy issue here is how much
should the exchange rate be allowed to
fluctuate or adjust, vis-a-vis the tradeoff
between the real economic costs of ex-
change rate fluctuations and inflation. In
other words, if the external sector has to
be protected, how does one reconcile a
stable exchange rate and simultaneously
control domestic money supply with capi-
tal mobility. This is the familiar macro-
economic policy trilemma [Obstfeld and
Taylor 2001] where the conflict facing
policy-makers is the choice between a fixed
exchange rate, capital mobility and an
activist monetary policy, when only two
of the three objectives can be chosen. One
may also mention here that the policy option
of protecting exports through subsidies, as
a safeguard against adverse exchange rate
movements, is now constrained by the
current environment of globalisation and
trade agreements.
One option that could be explored in the
face of capital inflow surges is absorption
by the external sector through encouraging
capital outflows. The policy response
during the 1993-97 surge did liberalise
capital outflows to contain appreciation
pressures. This response actually facili-
tated trade liberalisation as it was possible
to pursue import liberalisation despite the
expected impact upon the current account.
South Korea exercised this option succes-
sfully during its current account surplus of
1986-88 when it actively encouraged capital
outflows by residents.20
India is gradually liberalising its capital
account and the issue of freeing capital
outflows is controversial. Presently,
restrictions upon outflows stem mainly
from the concern that the rupee needs to
be protected from a speculative attack de-
pleting foreign exchange reserves. Current
trends in reserve accumulation reveal that
maintaining a sizeable level of foreign
exchange reserves is an important objec-
tive of the central bank. Undoubtedly,
holding an adequate level of reserves, along
with other policy instruments, is necessary
armour to enable the central bank to
respond quickly to short-term capital in-
flows and outflows. A second weapon to
counter external pressures emerging from
capital account transactions is capital
controls. There is no doubt, particularly in
the aftermath of the currency crises, that
capital controls have reemerged as a self-
protection device to safeguard against
heavy capital surge pressures. These can
be effective in managing the external
position, particularly in the short-run.
Countries that have used them success-
fully include Israel (1978), Chile (1991)
and Malaysia (1998-99).
Chile’s example illustrates the success-
ful use of dynamic and comprehensive
policy in this context. Initially, when capital
started flowing into Chile, it was perceived
to be temporary and the Chilean authori-
ties resisted nominal exchange rate appre-
ciation, sterilising their purchases. When
the flows persisted however, the authori-
ties changed track, allowing greater ex-
change rate flexibility, lowering sterili-
sation and imposing restriction on capital
inflows, particularly short-term capital.
While some, like Khan and Reinhart (1995),
have argued that taxation of short-term
flows can be subverted through over-in-
voicing and under-invoicing of imports
and exports in the long-run, empirical
evidence [Gregorio, Edwards and Valdes,
2000] shows that capital controls had a
persistent and sizeable effect upon the
composition of capital inflows in Chile,
tilting them towards longer maturity.
In the current global financial environ-
ment, capital controls, if carefully timed
and fine-tuned to being imposed in rough
weather and removed in smoother times,
can be used effectively in conjunction with
other policy instruments, like greater ex-
change rate flexibility, part sterilisation
and encouraging outflows, to manage the
capital account. A comprehensive policy
package, as Chile’s example shows, might
perhaps be the best course in order to
minimise costs associated with extreme
use of a single policy option.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
[The views expressed are the author’s own and
not of the institution to which she belongs. I am
indebted to Pronab Sen for very helpful comments
on an earlier version of this paper.
Part II of this paper will appear next week.]
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1 Since then capital flows have been on a
declining trend; both portfolio and FDI flows
have not reached the peak level of 1995.
2 Net private capital flows to emerging markets
increased seven-fold between 1990 and 1996
[Glick 1998:4-5].
3 These figures exclude years 1990-91 due to
the balance of payments crisis as a result of
which there was extensive capital flight of
non-resident Indian capital from India (see
Economic Survey, 1990-91, 1991-92, MoF,
GoI).
4 See Khan and Reinhart (1995) for an exhaustive
documentation of capital inflows into Latin
America and east Asia.
5 Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) offer
empirical evidence in support of this
argument.
6 See Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1993)
and Hernandez and Rudolph (1995) who
document the role of domestic factors in
attracting capital flows. Recent research by
Bohn and Tesar (1998) assesses the role of
local versus global ‘push’ factors in this context
and finds that the former was relatively more
important in determining US investment in
Asian markets.
7 Currency realignment has been offered as
another explanation for stimulating capital
flows by Goldberg and Klein (1998). Khan and
Reinhart (1995) note that reasons vary across
Latin America and Asia; for instance, external
factors have been more important for the former
group.
8 Source: ‘India External Debt: A Status Report’,
GoI, MoF, DEA, June 1999.
9 A dual exchange rate regime replaced the
basket-linked peg in 1991, signalling transition
to the floating exchange rate regime in 1993.
10 These consist of progressive reduction in tariff
rates and removal of quantitative restrictions
on imports. The average rate of tariffs, which
was 125 in 1991, was successively reduced
to 50 per cent by 1995. See Krueger and
Chinnoy (2000).
11 This can be observed under the heading
commercial borrowings in Table 1. These are
closely monitored by the authorities, with
annual limits on borrowings. Only companies
with a proven track record are permitted to
raise capital abroad through depository issues.
12 Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) however,
provide a different view on this. They show
both categories of capital flows to hold
equivalent time-series properties.
13 The post-1991 period is also concomitant
with regulatory, institutional and other
changes in the capital market. In part, these
measures have also contributed to the upward
trend in stock market prices through increase
in investor confidence and attracting greater
funds.
14 For a complete discussion on macroeconomic
policy response to capital inflows during this
period, see Economic Survey, 1994-95 and
Acharya (1999).
15 Both consumer and wholesale price inflation
rose between 1993-95, the peak period of
inflows and again in 1996-97, when inflows
resumed.
16 The base of March 1993 is reported to have
been notionally established as an ‘equilibrium’
rate for the rupee by the official authorities.
See ‘Money Market Review’, EPW Research
Foundation, Economic and Political Weekly,
September 13, 1997: 2306.
17 See Kohli (2001, forthcoming) for empirical
evidence in support of this hypothesis.
18 A further source of expansion in loanable
resources of the domestic banks could
surface through impending financial reform
measures  like reduction in reserve
requirements or disinvestment proceeds that
might be deployed to retire internal public
debt.
19 Since the current account deficit equals the
difference between national saving and
investment, imbalances in it can result from
either a fall in savings or a rise in investment.
A current account deficit stemming from
a rise in investment is more desirable since
it leads to an increase in productive capacity
and economic growth. On the other hand,
a fall in the savings rate driving the current
account deficit indicates a rise in consumption.
20 Koo and Park (1994).
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